Accountability is considered to be central to the functioning of a democratic and informed society. A large volume of literature theorises accountability and explains how it should be and could be deepened. There is a general view that the availability of state held information can enhance possibilities of citizen participation and democratic governance, and check unethical and corrupt behaviour by state and corporate elites. The state held documents can arguably enable citizens to construct a richer account of corporate frauds, accounting/auditing scandals and regulatory failures and call policymakers to account. The neoliberal state has managed the tensions between the public demands for information and the tendency to protect elites from public scrutiny by regularising the flow of information via freedom of information laws. Such laws hold out the possibility of greater information, but also give state officials plenty of discretion to frustrate unwelcome requests. The issues are explored through two case studies relating to banking frauds in the UK. The cases highlight the dynamics of calling the state to account through the freedom of information laws and show that the state apparatus goes to considerable lengths to shield elites from public scrutiny. 
enmeshed in public policymaking (Cousins, Mitchell and Sikka, 1993) . In the absence of public information, people often rely on whistleblowers and conscientious objectors to bring some damning information to the public domain and fuel debates about the accountability of public policymakers (Ponting, 1985) .
The dawn of modernity has been accompanied by concerns to "break up the patches of darkness that blocked the light, eliminate the shadowy areas of society, demolish the unlit chambers where arbitrary political acts, monarchical caprice, religious superstitions, tyrannical and priestly plots, epidemics and the illusions of ignorance were fomented" (Foucault, 1980: 153) . Such concerns have given rise to the politics of establishing new 'regimes of truth' culminating in freedom of information laws to control the flow of the state held information to citizens. Following persistent criticisms (Bennett, 1985; Vincent 1998; Birkinshaw, 2010) Critics claims that the FOIA may not "limit the deception and deliberate misinformation" (O'Neill, 2002) because the legislation can also be used to legitimise resistance to the release of information (Brooke, 2010) . This paper contributes to the literature on accountability by showing how calls for public accountability are frustrated and resisted by UK government departments. The evidence is presented through two case studies relating to UK banking frauds. The case studies are constructed from direct engagement with the state apparatus through requests made under the UK freedom of information law 3 . Prior research (Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Arnold and Sikka, 2001 ) provided awareness of some contours of organised secrecy and suggested that the FOIA could be used to secure information. The requests were made in late 2005/early 2006 and were informed by concerns about regulation of banks. For example, by the late 2005 newspapers carried stories of the bursting of the housing bubble and a possible crisis for some banks. This had echoes of the mid-1970s secondary banking crash, which revealed fraud and audit failures (Reid, 1982) . The state managed the crisis by appointing inspectors to investigate the collapses. One of these related to Ramor Investments Limited (previously known as Bryanston Finance), which owned a secondary bank (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1983) . The inspectors' interim report criticised directors and auditors, but the final report remained unpublished (Sikka and Willmott, 1995) .
The unpublished report had the potential to provide insights into the politics of regulation and was, therefore, the subject of a freedom of information request. The second request also related to concerns about regulation. Despite anti-moneylaundering legislation, UKbased banks have continued to be enable elites to launder illicit funds (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005; UK Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006) . These instances had echoes of the operations of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which pleaded guilty to fraud and money laundering and was closed by the Bank of England in July 1991 (Bingham, 1992) . BCCI was considered to be the "world's biggest fraud" (Killick, 1998, p. 151) , but its closure has remained shrouded in secrecy. Some gaps in publicly available information have been identified by prior research Mitchell et al., 2001 ), most notably a report codenamed the "Sandstorm Report", which was prepared by BCCI's auditors Price Waterhouse and enabled the Bank of England to justify closure of BCCI (Bingham, 1992 ; United States, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1992) . The second request, therefore, related to access to the Sandstorm Report.
The research described in this paper was conducted in what may loosely be described as 'action research' (McSweeney, 2000) where inquiry is regarded as a dynamic process and a response to the problems encountered rather than the application of some predetermined set of rules. Such engagements are framed by situated understandings of the material in hand, the importance of the issues, reflexivity of analysis and a range of pragmatic values.
The cases reported in this paper involved direct engagement with ministers, lawyers, courts, judges and the state apparatus, with some unexpected outcomes. This paper is organised in four further sections. The first section highlights some complexities and contradictions in the policies of the state, which arguably could enhance and/or frustrate accountability. The second section provides a brief over view of the UK freedom of information legislation. The third section provides the two case studies based to the freedom of information requests relating to the collapse of Ramor Investments and the closure of BCCI. The fourth section concludes the paper with some discussion and reflections on the case studies.
Accountability and the State
The public administration of contemporary societies takes place in bureaucratic organisations characterised by rationalisation, calculation, efficiency and predictability (Weber, 1948; 1968) . Government departments operate through hierarchical structures and management is primarily based on expert training and written rules. Civil servants are inculcated into the ethos of government departments and their career advancement depends on compliance with formal and informal rules. They advise ministers and policymakers and shape public choices. The resulting written documents have a potential to provide insights into the data used in policymaking, as well as the processes and outcomes involving a variety of political and economic calculations (Hennessy, 2010) . Such documents are shaped by the interests already embedded within the system and also by lobbying. Historically, the documents have been accessible to a select few and the state officials have not been obliged to provide the same to the public, unless governments choose otherwise. Much of the freedom for information lobby is driven by the claims that public availability of official documents will enhance democracy and public accountability, curb unethical behaviour and improve public policy-making (Bennett, 1985; Vincent 1998; Birkinshaw, 2010) . However, the documents are prepared and held within an organisational context which may not necessarily share the same aspirations and officials may develop diverse strategies for resisting, or obfuscating the release of the information.
The public availability of information may show governments to be responsive to citizens' needs, or can equally demonstrate that they are poorly equipped to deal with the challenges. However, the provision of information per se does not necessarily increase transparency or accountability, as that depends on the context and understanding of events shaping the production and consumption of information. Once the information is widely available and dissected, informed citizens can construct counter accounts to challenge the official narratives and pose unsettling questions. Faced with the likelihood of public exposure, policymakers may seek to shift blame for questionable practices, or may even deny that they were briefed about the possible negative outcomes of their policies. A critical public scrutiny can unsettle the sense of predictability instilled into a bureaucratic system and may persuade government officials to withhold information or release it selectively. The secrecy may shield ministers, government departments and elites from scrutiny, but also has the capacity to erode trust and foster a legitimacy crisis (Habermas, 1976) . The extent of contradictions and complexities depends on local histories, politics and institutional structures (Ellington, 2011) .
Perceptions of risks and uncertainty may be shaped by official documents and analysis, which can make stakeholders aware of the data, policies, reason for policy changes and trajectories for the future. The public availability of information can enable citizens to manage risks and uncertainty by factoring predictability of government policies into their calculations. Consequently, stakeholders may be able to build informed models and be in a position to lobby for/against likely policy changes. The availability of information has the capacity to discipline policymakers because they know that a public scrutiny of their practices can highlight illegal and unethical practices. Arguably, the public provision of information makes government policy predictable and enables citizens and businesses to negotiate uncertainty.
The tendencies toward relative openness are shaped by the competing pressures for legitimacy and the mutual dependence of state and capital. As the ultimate guarantor of capitalism, the state manages the inherent crisis by instituting policies to stabilise or displace the crisis (O'Connor, 1987) . These policies may require investment in public goods, bailouts of banks, investigation of corporate collapses and frauds, or promises of releasing official government documents to reassure citizens that the state is accountable to them. However, policies for greater openness or transparency need to have regard for corporate interests. This constraint arises from the nature of neoliberal politics. The neoliberal state is dissuaded from directly owning the means of production and is obliged to rely upon tax revenues levied on profits, wages and consumption, which are largely dependent on private capital (Offe, 1984) . Therefore, the state's own survival is dependent on the long-term welfare of capitalism and the two are interdependent for their mutual reproduction and growth. The mutual dependence is intensive in many fields and is highly visible in the defence industry. The state relies upon corporations to secure its position in a hostile nation-state system and in turn the defence industry relies upon the state for its profits. The dependence is not necessarily confined to domestic capital as in a globalised economy capital roams the world in pursuit of profits. For example, the presence of foreign banks can stimulate local investment, credit, jobs and financing of exports. These factors then become enmeshed in relations with other states and weigh upon policies of openness which may appease domestic constituencies, but may be seen as hostile by some fractions of capital and international allies. At the same time, the state cannot afford to be seen to be nakedly privileging corporate interests as that can erode its claims of being a neutral adjudicator of social conflicts. Therefore, it may bolster its legitimacy by making some concessions and one of these may be to process demands for a kind of openness which regulates the flow of information to the public.
The state seeks to forge alliances with elites whose expertise is assumed to be helpful in displacing or managing the inherent crisis. This enables some elites to acquire an insider status and a position to influence public policies and shape perceptions of the kind of information which may or may not be released to the public. For example, the UK state has failed to develop in-house structures for investigation of major corporate collapses and thus reassure the public that capitalism is not corrupt. It has been persuaded to see frauds through the lens of accounting and has often delegated the investigation of corporate frauds to partners of major accounting firms (Sikka and Willmott, 1995) . This may serve some administrative purposes, but also gives leading accountants easy access to the state apparatus and create possibilities of advancing interpretations of what may or may not be in the public interest, or the documents which may be released to the public.
The notions of transparency and public accountability are mediated through a complex web of relationships enmeshing the state, capital and elites. Elites have numerous opportunities to influence policies and practices relating to the release of the state-held information. For example, corporate funding of political parties enhances corporate access to policymakers and influence policies (Palast, 2002) . The privatisation of public enterprises and the reliance on the private sector to provide public goods has also strengthened the links between the state and economic elites (Pierson, 1994) . In addition, through revolving-doors, executives from major corporations are frequently seconded to government departments and many former and potential ministers are hired by corporations. Such links have the capacity to undermine the state's aura of being a neutral arbiter of social welfare, but may be countered by practices which greater amount of information in the public domain.
The links between governments and corporations increasingly blur the distinction between the state and the private sector and fuel the suspicion that the state is captured by big business, or advances the interests of a dominant class. Such perceptions antagonise other fractions of capital and undermine the state's aura of being a neutral arbiter of social welfare. Government policies which enable some selected insiders to have access to information, but deny it to others enhance uncertainty for many citizens and erode confidence in the political system. Such pressures may be managed through the enactment of freedom of information laws to control flow of information.
The calls of greater transparency and information frequently underestimate the capacity of bureaucratic systems to engage in creative or grudging compliance which uses the law to obstruct inquiry and exhaust the energies of inquirers (Hood and Heald, 2006) . The documents may be written in an arcane language designed to protect and shield the originators of documents rather than inform the public. Thus transparency may not easily be equated with effective communication. Even the practices designed to enable the public to secure the information are likely to be immersed in legalistic jargon that overwhelms the desire to obtain information. The proponents of freedom of information hope that it will change the culture of government departments, but sceptics argue that "the probability that the adoption of an FOI [Freedom of Information] law will lead to cultural change or improve trust is small. Experience has shown that the governing institution in Westminster systems are particularly resilient and capable of rejecting alien transplantation such as FOI laws, or of developing new routines designed to minimize the disruptive effect of these new laws" (Roberts, 2006:108) . The case studies in the later parts of this paper will shed light on some of the practices of government departments and the state apparatus designed to regulate them.
The next section provides a brief overview of the UK's freedom of information legislation.
The Freedom of Information Legislation
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000 created a public "right of access" rather than a "right to know" the information held by public authorities. It came into force on 1 January 2005. Within the FOIA, the term 'public authorities' refers to public bodies which exercise public functions. It applies to over 100,000 bodies including government departments, local councils, police, hospitals, schools and family doctors. Each of the public authorities is required to have administrative systems to enable it to meet its statutory obligations.
The FOIA grants the right to access to all individuals, including people living abroad, non-UK citizens, lobby groups and commercial organisations. The Act is retrospective and requests can be made for information held before its enactment even if the body is not the originator of the information (UK House of Commons Library, 2004) . The requests must be in writing and applicants do not need to give a reason for seeking information. Most requests are free but government departments can refuse requests if the costs of providing the information exceed £600 4 . The limit for other public bodies is £450. All public authorities are expected to respond to a request within 20 working days. The Act is administered by the Information Commissioner's Office, whose mission is to "uphold information rights in the public interest, promoting openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals 5 ".
The concept of "the public interest" is central to the FOIA though the legislation does not define it. It is content to let the concept evolve through practice. In responding to requests for information all public authorities are expected to have regard for the public interest. A guide to accompanying the legislation (Information Commissioner's Office, 2006) provides an indication of the factors which may be considered in assessing whether the public interest is served. These could relate to furthering the understanding of and participation in the public debate of issues of the day, promoting accountability and transparency by public authorities for decisions taken by them, promoting accountability and transparency in the spending of public money, allowing individuals and companies to understand decisions made by public authorities affecting their lives and information affecting public health and public safety.
The public authorities can withhold information by invoking any of the twenty-three public interest exemptions, which are categorised as 'absolute exemptions' and 'qualified exemptions'. 'Absolute exemptions' (Sections 21, 23, 32, 34, 40, 41 and 44 of the FOIA 2000) cover seven distinct areas and apply to matters where there is no legal right of access to the information, or the information relates to security matters, parliamentary privilege, court records, personal information, information provided in confidence or generally prohibited by law, or the information is available through other means. The second category 'qualified exemptions' covers sixteen distinct areas (Sections 22-24, 26 -31, 33, 35-38, 40, 42 and 43 of the FOIA 2000.) . It requires the public authority to consider the balance of public interest lies in releasing and/or withholding the public information. This would depend on the circumstances of each case and may be influenced by common law precedents. Qualified exemptions relate to matters intended for future publication, national security, defence, international relations, relations within the UK, the economy, investigations and proceedings, law enforcement, audit function of public authorities, formulation of government policy, prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs, communications with the monarch and royal family, health and safety, personal information, legal professional privilege and matters of commercial interest. Some of the above may be characterised as 'Class' exemptions and protect all the information in that category. For example, information subject to legal-professional privilege would be protected in its entirety. The remainder may broadly be characterised as Prejudice-based exemptions. A good example of this is the international relations exemption where a public authority could argue that the release of the information could prejudice international relations with one or more states.
The withholding of information may lead to disputes and the FOIA provides a stepped process for resolution. In the first instance, individuals can request an independent internal review (section 50 FOIA 2000), effectively inviting the public authority to reconsider its decision. The internal review is expected to be completed within forty working days and would normally be carried out by individuals not associated with the initial decision to withhold information. If this process does not resolve the dispute then the concerned individuals can invite the Information Commissioner to adjudicate the dispute. If the Commissioner is so persuaded he may investigate the matter and seek explanations from the public authorities and sight of the disputed information. Following an investigation, the Commissioner would publish a Decision Notice to explain his conclusions and make recommendations, which might support the public authority, the complainant or something in-between. He may also praise the public authority for good practice, or admonish it for breaches of the Act and issue enforcement orders.
The parties may dispute the Decision Notice issued by the Information Commissioner and take the matter to the next level. The first port-of-call is the 'Information Rights Tribunal' (previously known the Information Tribunal). This is a panel composed of the Tribunal Judge and two other non-legal members, all appointed by the Justice Department. The appeal has to be lodged on an official form within 28 days of the Decision Notice. The parties can choose to have an oral or a paper-based hearing, though the judges can override the choices made by the parties. Both parties can use legal experts to advise them, or can represent themselves in person. In the first instance, cases are heard by the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). Following the FTT decision, the parties may appeal and can seek permission to take matters to a higher court, known as the Upper Tribunal. In principle, depending on the legal issues, matters can reach the Supreme Court. The level of escalation inevitably involves legal ramifications and also the danger that a case may be declared "vexatious" and that costs may be awarded against the parties (Brooke, 2010) .
The judges can also award costs against either party for unreasonable behaviour.
Two Case Studies
This section provides details of two case studies constructed from responses to the freedom of information requests. The first relates to attempts to secure an unpublished report relating to the demise of Ramor Investments Limited (formerly Bryanston Finance Limited), a secondary bank that became subject to a government investigation in 1975. The second relates to attempts to secure the Sandstorm Report, a report which arguably played a major role in the Bank of England's decision to close BCCI. hearing, one of the inspectors described the non-publication of the final report as "disturbing". The reasoning given by the Minister for non-publication was that "there has been no public interest in the investigation … publication at this late stage will serve to revive memories of the disciplinary proceedings taken against Price Waterhouse" (UK House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, 1990: 221-222) . Subsequently, the Minister informed parliament that "Two of those criticised in the Ramor report made representations against publication of the final report. It would not be proper to go into further detail 
The Request for Information
On 18 you will recall is the Director General will carry out the review you requested". In addition, the reply stated that "we do not hold the information relating to the report being destroyed.
… we are unable to say with complete certainty whether the report was destroyed … we no longer hold a copy of the final report". "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 14 It was, and still is, our policy to publish reports on pubic companies The ministerial adviser(s) referred to correspondence and questions in parliament from Austin Mitchell MP and added that "There was also the danger that publication of the final report would revive memories of the accountants disciplined and involve them in a degree of "double jeopardy". No honourable members pressed for or against publication of the final report. Two of those criticised in the report argued against publication"
The second (undated) item added that "Austin Mitchell knows that the accountant inspector in Gilgate, Peter Ainger FCA of Price Waterhouse, was the subject of another inspection in Ramor where he and his firm were criticised and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
17
. The final report in Ramor was not published (only the interim report). Austin Mitchell suspects a cover up despite an explanation in earlier correspondence, principally John Redwood's 18 letter dated 19 September 1991. ). The DBIS acknowledged that some information relating to the Ramor investigation existed, but was not willing to identify or release it even though it related to events which occurred over thirty years ago. In the absence of the final report, perhaps the DBIS should release whatever information it held. It was decided to refer the matter to the Information Commissioner.
The Information Commissioner
On 2 . A further letter on 23 January 2008, which was copied to Sikka, inquired about the details of the searches carried out to locate the missing report and also requested that Sikka be given the right to request a review by the DBIS's decision to invoke Section 41 to withhold information and added that "…some of the information is now thirty years old and therefore whilst it may have been confidential and sensitive at the time of the investigation its age may now be a factor which I will have to consider when making a decision. This is particularly the case where the complainant has raised the matter of age with the ICO". . The extracts released provided some food for thought by stating that "…in 1977 they [inspectors] referred to the Department evidence of possible criminal offences. … In doing so they said that it was difficult to decide whether the conduct they referred to was fraudulent or reckless or merely incompetent. … In 1979 they referred to the Department evidence suggesting commission of two tax frauds. They decided that it would be wrong to complete their enquiries until the Inland Revenue decided whether action was justified so in 1981 they submitted a substantial interim report which contained all the findings except that they had not investigated fully the tax matters referred to. …in 1983 disciplinary proceedings were taken by the Institute of Chartered Accountant of England and Wales against firms and individual accountants they had criticised… Price Waterhouse, auditors of Bryanston and two of its subsidiaries … were reprimanded … They appealed but lost and ended up being ordered to pay a total of £273,000 towards the costs. Mr. Ainger, a partner in Price Waterhouse was reprimanded as was secretary of Bryanston, Mr. Fitzhugh. Goodman Jones, a firm which acted for a company which bought Bryanston in 1975, were admonished…
The inspectors conclude their report by pointing out that as a result of the publication of their interim report certain accountancy firms and individual accountants were criticised and ordered to pay costs and this was publicised. The criminal matters they reported to the Department in 1979, by virtue of them being criminal, were not included in their report and hence no disciplinary action was taken against the partners in [REDACTED -FOIA 2000 sections 31(1)(d) and 40(2)] 23 involved or against that firm and the suspected criminal conduct of all four persons referred to above was not publicised. They say that in their opinion this was unfair. They recommend that copies of their report be sent to the Inland Revenue and to the Institute of Chartered Accountants". Details and descriptions of the "two tax frauds" were withheld, but the censored text seemed to point the finger at professionals, possibly including accountants, especially as 22 Some further extracts were released later (see below). 23 The words in bold letters appear in the document released to Sikka. the inspectors asked for the copies of their report to be sent to the Institute of Chartered Accountants.
On 31 March 2008, Sikka asked the DTI to conduct an independent internal review of its decision to withhold some information and the outcome was communicated on 3 June 2008. As regards the allegations of tax fraud, the letter said that the matter was referred to Inland Revenue and, "following an investigation, the allegations were dealt with by way of a confidential settlement between the Revenue and the taxpayers involved … I do not consider it would be right to release details of the settlement reached between the Inland Revenue and the tax payers which was confidential" Without listing any documents, the Reviewer said that some papers are being withheld and also invoked the Data Protection Act to support his decisions, but said that "slightly more" information can now be disclosed. Extracts from the previously withheld paragraph 4 (see above) stated that "The suspected offences were the evasion of tax totalling £355,000 by backdating purchase documents to support claims of group tax relief. [Redated FOIA s.31(1)(d), 31(1)(g) and 40(2)] The inspectors report that in 1984 they were informed by the Department that the Inland Revenue were not going to prosecute but had instituted civil proceedings against [Redacted FOIA s.40(2)]. The inspectors decided to delay completion of their report until the civil proceedings, which began in February 1986, were over. In April 1986 they reported that they were informed by the Department that those proceedings had been settled [Redacted FOIA s.31(1)(d) and s.40(2)].
The extracts released from the previously suppressed paragraph 5 said that "The inspectors criticise the fact that the settlements reached with [Redacted FOIA s40(2)] included in each case an express term whereby all parties agreed to keep the settlements confidential. … The Inspectors cannot see how this was in the interests of the Revenue or in the public interest. [Redacted FOIA s40(2)] solicitors provided information on the terms of the settlement which forebade the Inspectors to include the information in a published report. The Inspectors refused to submit to these terms because they did not think that it was in the public interest to accept evidence on a confidential or conditional basis. …" A number of redacted letters, minutes and handwritten documents were also released to This is available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/decisionnotices/2010/fs_50129139.pdf 25 The request for information was made on 18 November 2005. 26 This is listed in Appendix C accompanying the Decision Notice. However, Appendix C was neither sent to the complainant nor made public because at the date of the DN the information in Appendix C is disputed information, which in principle can be the subject of litigation, and is thus treated as confidential. , 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c ), but none were given sight of the Sandstorm Report.
The US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs had access to both the full and a censored version of the Sandstorm Report. It stated that the "report has been provided to the Subcommittee solely in a heavily censured form by the Federal Reserve at the insistence of the Bank of England, which forbid the Federal Reserve from providing a clean copy of the report to the Congress on the ostensible ground that to do so would violate British bank secrecy and confidentiality laws" (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1992: 53).
Subsequently, the Senate Committee added that it "obtained an uncensored version of the report from a former BCCI official, which revealed criminality on an even wider scale than that set forth in the censured version" (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1992: 53).
In accordance with the US freedom of information laws, the censored copy of the The Prime Minister's letter of 16 June 1999 said that "… certain US authorities were provided with copies (with some information deleted in certain cases) and the copies were not marked "confidential", they were provided under conditions of confidentiality"
A further letter, dated 2 August 1999, said that "… copies of the draft report (in unredacted or redacted form) were made available to the US authorities on the basis that confidentiality would be protected. It was, however, recognised that if information was required by Congress (eg the House Banking Committee) it would have to be provided. However, even then the Committee would protect the confidential information or parts of it". 
The Request for Information
There October. In an email dated 26th October 2006, the Treasury case manager replied that "As you may well be aware, the ongoing BCCI litigation only concluded recently. Due to the complexity of the case and the report we have had to consult third parties to ensure that we meet the significant duties placed upon us by the Data Protection Act and the Freedom of Information Act. … we are very close to a conclusion and expect to reply formally to your request within a week or two" The above seemed to suggest that Treasury was content for Sikka to obtain a copy of the Sandstorm Report, as long as it was not seen to be releasing it (see more below). Thirdly, the 28 March 2007 letter said that "The demise of BCCI remains a sensitive issue and we have needed to consult others over the release of the information in this report. We have also had to consider the legal position in relation to the release of the individual pieces of information in the report that are not readily available to the public and consider whether release would be prohibited by section 44 of the Freedom of Information Act. …we are able to release to you some additional unpublished information from the draft report …".
The "additional unpublished information" released by the Treasury was Section 1 of the Sandstorm Report and headed 'History and current status of problems'. It consisted of four pages of text and was not really new as it was freely available from the US Congress Library. It is just that some of these pages were not placed by Sikka on the internet.
Fourthly, the Treasury was unwilling to release the missing parts of the version of the Report available from the US Congress Library and the internet. Its position was that "The information constitutes personal data, and disclosure would in our view contravene data protection principles. Section 40 (2) is an absolute exemption and we are not required to consider the public interest in release. … In this instance we consider in particular that the release of names would breach the First Data Protection Principle. Where names have not been mentioned in evidence during litigation and are not otherwise in the public domain we consider that it would not be fair to release the names, even after 16 years. …In relation to the release of names where the fact and nature of individuals' connections with BCCI may have already been made public by others not subject to the Data Protection Act, we consider that does not absolve us from our duty to consider the conditions on disclosure related to it ...".
Fifthly, the Treasury invoked disclosure exemptions under the FOIA and said that it would not release the key names on the basis that "…the release, by the UK government, of this information would be likely to provoke a negative reaction that would damage the UK's international relations and may harm its ability to protect and promote UK interests abroad"
To sum up, the Treasury did not provide any of the missing information. It justified its refusal by using the public interest exemptions contained in the FOIA. However, it also indicated that a copy of the report could be obtained from the courts though it did not identify the court(s) or the process by which someone can obtain a document filed with it.
On 14 Human Rights Act 1998 to argue that release of the information would violate privacy of the "individuals who were employed, or had been employed by BCCI; also the names of individuals who had had financial dealings with BCCI … It is not easy to ascertain who was tried and found guilty of offences in relation to BCCI, but where individuals were tried and found guilty of offences they would have received appropriate punishment from the courts and it would be unfair, after this time, to publicise their involvement again. For those employed by BCCI who had not been found guilty of any offence it would be unfair to release information about their association with BCCI as this might be detrimental to them in their current employment or their employment prospects. The same reasoning applies to those who had financial dealings with BCCI …".
In addition, the Treasury repeated its previous assertion that the public interest in releasing the information was outweighed by the 40 Hansard, House of Common Debates, 7 January 2008, col. 340.
"public interest in maintaining good relations with other states. …the sensitivity here is not so much around new information finding its way into the public domain, but in relation to the damage likely to be caused through the release by the UK government (emphasised in the original) of this information".
The above was considered to be unsatisfactory. For example, if the wrongdoers have already been identified and punished, it is difficult to see how their human rights were being protected by withholding the contents of the Sandstorm Report. The identity of these individuals would probably already be known to employers in the finance industry and in any case they would be obliged to provide a truthful account of their employment history on their job application forms. Some may also have died in the intervening years. If any employees, depositors or lenders were innocently caught up with BCCI frauds, the Treasury could redact their names and release the rest.
The Information Commissioner
On 16 (paragraphs 88, 90-93). However, it stated (paragraph 87) that "The Treasury was correct to withhold the parts of the report that it did not disclose to the complainant on the basis of the exemptions contained in section 21, 40(2) and 27(1)(a) of the Act".
The Appeal
Paragraph 94 of the Decision Notice reminded the parties that they can appeal against the Commissioner's decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within 28 calendar days. The Decision Notice was not accompanied by a form which would need to be completed to lodge an appeal with the Information Tribunal though it contained a website address for further information.
Unlike most of the previous correspondence, the Decision Notice was not sent electronically to Sikka. Instead, it was mailed by the Commissioner's office on 14
December 2009, during the last week of the academic term, to his university address. Royal
Mail confirmed that the document was delivered the next day to Sikka's work address, but he did not see it. The next few days coincided with attendance at conferences, followed by . However, the proceedings were to be delayed as on 14
July 2010 the Information Commissioner did two things. Firstly, he asked the Upper
Tribunal with an application for permission to appeal against the FTT judgment, which allowed Sikka's late appeal. Secondly, he also sought a judicial review of the FTT with the appeal process and the public interest in the disputed information. Following the judgement, it is possible to apply for an extension of time to appeal before lodging the actual appeal. Since May 2010, the instructions issued by the UK Department of Justice for completion of the Notice of Appeal form for freedom of information disputes refer appellants to the "Ruling in Prof Sikka v Information Commissioner dated 9 April 2010". 47 Sikka was invited to add his observations on the appeal. 48 See the final four pages of http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/courts-andtribunals/tribunals/information-rights/how-to-appeal/Prof-Sikka-vs-IC-Ruling-0410-9.4.10_(w The lawyers representing the Treasury, however, secured a vital concession from the judge in that it did not have to show its arguments and evidence for opposing the release of information to Sikka. The evidence would only be available to the Tribunal and its members could then decide whether in the light of arguments advanced by Sikka the disputed information could be released. The logic was that the Sandstorm Report was confidential and so were the arguments was the case, including witness statements, for withholding its release. Indeed, most of the evidence subsequently submitted by the Treasury, which included a full witness statement from a senior Foreign Office official, on 9 May 2011, was considered to be confidential and Sikka was unable to cross-examine it. The same logic did not apply in reverse. The restrictions meant that the responsibility for cross-examination fell on the Tribunal members. Therefore, it became vitally important to provide some ammunition to the Tribunal to enable it to interrogate the Treasury's case. In the absence of legal advisers, he was not sure whether these interpretations were appropriate and more importantly such a move would have enabled the Treasury's and the Commissioner's lawyers to excel by providing authoritative counter interpretations.
Obviously, the judges knew that it was a contest between a layperson and lawyers funded by the state and as a result may well have been sympathetic to the layperson. So the concern was to provide judges with arguments with which they could interrogate the Treasury's case for withholding information. The affidavit provided background to the BCCI frauds, the significance of the Sandstorm Report, silence of the UK government, the public availability of large parts of the Sandstorm report and emphasised the age of the information, which by now was nearly twenty-years old, together with a variety of arguments that the public interest would be served by the release of the Sandstorm Report. By March 2011, the US Congress Library had digitised some of its archives and as a result a large volume of BCCI related information became publicly available . In view of the change, its previous conduct was thought to be of public significance and was mentioned in the affidavit.
On 5 May 2011, the Tribunal asked the parties for three additional items of information.
These were, 1) a copy of the internet version of the Sandstorm Report. It would be recalled that this was placed on the internet by Sikka; 2) a full copy of the Bingham Report (Bingham, 1992) In response to the concerns that the disclosure would somehow prejudice relationship with one or more other states, the Tribunal said that "The public has an interest in seeing how each of those who carried out an investigation illuminated the facts and assessed the actions of those who were involved, whether they contributed to the problems, tried to resolve them or played a neutral role. The weight we apply to this element of public interest has been heavily influenced by our view of the importance of the events surrounding the collapse of BCCI, the serious ramifications it had for many innocent people caught up in it and the questions it raised about the regulation and auditing of a large international institution" (paragraph 30).
The Treasury and the Information Commissioner were rebuked for their interpretation of the data protection and privacy laws to shield individuals who were "the architects of a groupwide programme of fraud and concealment, not to mention the creation of a culture that led others with positions of responsibility within the bank to follow their lead" (paragraph 42).
The Tribunal made a distinction about the seniority of the individuals and how they performed at the time and on that basis ordered that the names of "… those having senior management positions in either BCCI or other organisations that were closely involved in the unlawful elements of its activities should be identified" (paragraph 36c).
The Tribunal also ordered the release of he names of most of the customers, on the basis that they "were not ordinary customers, but had become involved in the many complex and frequently incestuous transactions that enabled the BCCI management and a number of organisations and individuals close to it to commit or conceal fraud. Those frauds led to severe financial hardship for many of the "ordinary" customers and we have explained in Confidential Schedule 2 60 , by reference to each individual, why we consider that there is a legitimate interest in disclosing their involvement and that this will not cause unfairness or unwarranted intrusion into their privacy"
The judgement set a new legal precedent, making it difficult for the government to withhold the names of the wrongdoers. The Treasury was given 35 days to comply with the court order. It was also given the right of appeal. Subsequently, at Treasury's request (4th August 2011) the period was extended by another 28 days because "the decision in the appeal at issue related to a highly sensitive report … the process is taking some time due to the need to consult widely within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office …". On 7 September 2011, the Treasury informed the Tribunal it will not appeal the decision and on the same day, nearly five and years after the initial request, most of the Sandstorm Report was released to Sikka.
By comparing the version held in the US Congress Library (and also on the internet) with the version released by the UK Treasury, the information concealed by the UK government could now be read this is one of the occasions when it must still remain confidential". In principle, a formal legal process could have been launched to secure the evidence but was not pursued.
Summary and Discussion
Accountability and openness may be promoted as the cornerstones of democracy and responsible governance, but there is a difference between ideals and practices, promises and their implementations. This paper has provided as objective an account as is possible of two encounters with the UK state apparatus to show that despite the promises, the provision of information is frustrated and obstructed by bureaucratic and legalistic processes. It supplements previous research showing that the UK state's impulse is often to shield selected elites (Mitchell, Sikka and Willmott, 1998) , and elites themselves are also adept at using resources to obstruct calls for explanations of their conduct (Mitchell and Sikka, 2004) .
The two case studies presented in the paper are based upon data generated by freedom of information requests, which arguably had the potential to increase understanding of banking frauds, auditing and regulation. Both cases related to well known banking scandals and engaged with key state officials, including various ministers, civil servants, Information
Commissioner and judges. In principle, the freedom of information law can enable citizens to construct a richer account of corporate scandals and frauds, and call policymakers to account, but the paper drew attention to numerous difficulties in securing the information.
The government departments are not obliged to list the documents that they hold, which an interested citizen can then request. Rather the citizen somehow needs to be aware that a document may exist before requesting it. Concerned citizens have to negotiate laws which invoke notions of the 'public interest' to withhold information. Challenging official bureaucracy is difficult because laypersons are unlikely to have familiarity with case law or the complexities of legal language used, but public authorities have considerable legal resources.
In the case of Ramor Investments, only a persistent engagement with the state officials resulted in the release of some snippets of information. Without any public announcement, the government officials acted as judge, juries and arbiters of the pubic interest and destroyed key documents. The destruction of key documents continued even after the request for information was made and before the liquidation of the bank was finalised. The DBIS claim that it did not hold the final unpublished report on the collapse of Ramor
Investments cannot be independently corroborated and the Information Commissioner seems to have been persuaded to accept the Department's line. There were long delays in processing requests and other than an admonishment from the Commissioner there appeared to be no consequences for the DBIS. The Department was not fined, gave no undertakings for its conduct in the future, or explained how its procedures and processes would be improved. The information released by the DBIS showed that the state officials went to considerable lengths to shield Price Waterhouse and others from public scrutiny. In the face of fraud, government departments entered into private and confidential agreements with some elites to protect their identity. The inspectors investigating the Ramor collapse expressed some unhappiness with the non-publication of their report, but these were overridden in the anxieties to protect elites from public scrutiny. Seemingly, the subjectivity of the state officials is constructed in such a way that they have internalised the need to shield accountancy firms and elites from scrutiny.
In the case of BCCI, Sikka muddled through the legalistic processes and even the judges found some of his arguments to be "limited" and "inconclusive", but eventually a successful outcome was secured. The Information Commissioner promotes himself as "the authoritative arbiter of information rights, delivering high-quality, relevant and timely outcomes, responsive and outward-looking … Treasury's website. Under the FOIA, the public authorities are only obliged to release the information to the party requesting it. Therefore, the UK Treasury's obligation was discharged by releasing the information to Sikka, rather than to the public at large.
The contents of the Sandstorm Report also pose questions about the Bank of England's regulatory role. In the late 1990s, after the BCCI debacle, it lost its regulatory role, but in 2011 it was restored to its former regulatory role by the incoming Conservative and Liberal Democratic coalition administration. Given that it went to considerable lengths to shield wrongdoers, the likelihood of it being open and honest with parliament and the general public must be doubted. Citizens may seek a fuller account of banking frauds to call regulators and governments to account, but the Sandstorm Report provides only a tiny glimpse of the BCCI affair. A reading of various documents suggests that there are other unpublished coded reports, such as "Fork" and "Tumbleweed" and may be many more. As it has taken nearly five and half years to secure one document, the possibility to speedily securing other documents and constructing a fuller picture must be doubted. Much of the accounting and regulatory history is constructed from official narratives because the contemporary standards of objectivity ascribe a certain kind of hardness to official reports.
However, there is a possibility that the selective release or withholding of information only succeeds in constructing a certain kind of history, which lets elites off the hook.
Arguably, it is difficult to reach generalised conclusions from two case studies, but they draw attention to gaps between the public promises of accountability and bureaucratic practices that thwart the provision of information. It may be argued that the Information
Commissioner and the Information Tribunals played a key role in securing release of some of the information about Ramor and BCCI and that this shows that the state is responsive.
This assumes that it is reasonable for citizens to toil for years to obtain snippets of information. The freedom of information laws may enable citizens to secure some pieces of useful information, but cannot reconcile the tensions between secrecy, democracy, privacy and the pursuit of private and public interests because they are inherent in neoliberalism.
The extent of tensions is likely to depend on local histories and institutional structures.
Hopefully, others would engage with the state apparatus to provide further insights into the politics of accountability.
